Interview: Sridhar Rajagopalan on fixing India’s education landscape

Chief Learning Officer at EI, Rajagopalan is on the board of Central Square Foundation (CSF), Pratham, and has been on several state and central government committees on education. Rajagopalan believes better measurement is the key to improving India’s education outcomes. Unless one can assess how any offering or school is helping improve learning, what value can it add? This is the single biggest gap and problem he sees in the way the country’s education landscape is structured and this is being exploited in get-rich-quick schemes and offerings. Byjus might have imploded but many mini Byjus are targeting vulnerable parents and students.

Rajagopalan spoke to Anjuli Bhargava on Byju’s fiasco in India, some learnings and insights from it, and what he thinks needs to be done to prevent such episodes from recurring. Edited excerpts:

As someone experienced in this space, when did you begin to have doubts about Byju’s phenomenon as it unfolded and the way investors and company management were propping up the company's valuation?

Consider the business model of a conventional technology platform like Uber. There exists a clear value proposition: a driver seeking employment opportunities connects with passengers requiring transportation from point A to point B. Suppose the service can be provided at a cost comparable to or below traditional taxi services. In that case, it creates value for all stakeholders—the customer receives efficient service, the driver generates income, and the platform generates revenue. This model of clear value creation is evident across numerous successful businesses, including Amazon and Blinkit.

Education, however, presents a fundamentally different paradigm. A 2006 study conducted by us and featured in India Today magazine, revealed that even our premier private schools were failing to meet international learning standards—a concerning revelation that likely persists.

The challenge in education lies in quantifying value. It is often understood that parents from underprivileged backgrounds, who may lack formal education themselves, cannot accurately assess their children’s educational progress. A child might attend school for four years without developing basic literacy skills, yet the parents may believe their educational responsibilities have been fulfilled as the child went to school regularly and diligently. What we miss is that this phenomenon probably extends across socioeconomic strata. Even affluent parents often select educational institutions based on reputation or peer recommendations rather than empirical measures of educational effectiveness and do not really understand how well their children are learning.

Some years ago, there was a wave of companies offering ‘SmartClass’ solutions—digital screens and LCD boards in schools. When our organisation, Educational Initiatives, evaluated learning outcomes in schools that had installed SmartClasses, we found no measurable improvement in student performance. Nevertheless, schools continued to install and add SmartClasses as parents were willing to pay additional fees, regardless of educational impact.

This illustrates a fundamental issue: the lack of emphasis on measuring learning outcomes. In a scenario where two educational providers compete—one demonstrating measurable improvement in student learning versus another featuring celebrity endorsements—the latter typically attracts more parents, and hence more schools. To a large extent, I believe this is what happened with Byju’s.

For many years, I questioned Byju’s fundamental value proposition regarding improved learning outcomes—a question that remains unanswered. Surprisingly, I did not find this questioning from key stakeholders: investors, parents, third-party financiers, educational institutions, professionals, governmental bodies, or even the media.

Byju’s primary offering consisted of video content, similar to that available on YouTube and Khan Academy. Over the years, we have seen leading companies from across the world produce very high-quality educational content, yet command significantly lower valuations. The disparity suggests that market valuation was driven primarily by marketing efforts and promotional activities rather than educational efficacy.

How do other countries handle this? Is there some way for them to separate the wheat from the chaff?

The most effective arrangement we have seen is the requirement in some countries that schools undergo external assessments of learning outcomes which are reported to the government. Key aspects of these are sometimes made available so that parents can make informed decisions. India, however, lacks such requirements for schools or educational technology providers, which has contributed to the current challenges.

Other nations have implemented systematic evaluation protocols. The United States utilises standardised testing to establish school rankings based on student performance. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) maintains comprehensive rankings for all schools. India’s absence of mandatory learning outcome measurements creates a significant regulatory gap. The most effective solution would be to require these educational technology companies to submit random student samples for independent learning impact assessment.

Like some other education companies before it, Byju's successfully exploited this regulatory vacuum, leading to their respective difficulties.

Who is primarily to blame for this fiasco?

Apart from the company and its promoters, I would say that the primary responsibility lies with early-stage investors who prioritise financial returns over educational impact metrics.

But that is what aggressive investors are meant to do. Try and get the best returns for their money…so why blame them?

While that perspective has merit regarding pure investment strategy, it overlooks broader responsibilities. Investors should have conducted more rigorous due diligence, particularly regarding differentiation from existing market offerings that would justify such extraordinary valuations. Their substantial investments and resulting valuations inadvertently conferred legitimacy to the enterprise. Therefore, early investors bear some responsibility for the outcome.

This becomes important because Byju’s customers were parents from varying walks of life, not schools (which could have done some more due diligence themselves). If anything, these investments and valuations by investors further lent an air of credibility to Byju’s claims, and the parents are the ones who bore the brunt.

What happens now to the thousands of lower-middle-class parents who might have even taken third-party loans to buy Byju’s offerings for their children?

Yes, this situation has particularly affected parents with more limited financial means. We have known of cases of domestic staff, including drivers and security personnel, who obtained loans to purchase Byju’s products. While the specific mechanics of the insolvency process remain to be determined, these vulnerable stakeholders must receive priority consideration in bankruptcy proceedings, preceding the claims of investors and other parties. Any recovered assets should be distributed accordingly.

Would it be a State School Regulatory Authority (SSRA) that measures and makes this learning impact information available?

It is important to recognise this as a specialised technical domain. Drawing a parallel to pharmaceutical regulation, educational products should demonstrate efficacy through rigorous technical evaluation. While an SSRA could facilitate information dissemination, the assessment process requires partnership with qualified technical agencies employing scientific methodologies. The UAE exemplifies this approach by collaborating with leading international assessment organisations.

In India, even governmental bodies lack the necessary framework to evaluate educational effectiveness. For instance, a state government in India made a substantial investment in Byju’s packages for students—an order subsequently rescinded. Government entities are equally susceptible to misguided decision-making as other stakeholders.

Are there other smaller Byjus in the marketplace, such as Unacademy and Vedantu?

It is noteworthy that Pearson, one of the world’s preeminent education companies, previously announced intentions to publish learning impact metrics alongside financial results—an initiative that has not fully materialised.

The absence of learning outcome measurements extends beyond commercial entities to educational institutions. Publishing impact metrics should be as fundamental as reporting business metrics. While there exists a risk of other entities following Byju’s trajectory, some smaller operators may achieve business success through more conservative growth strategies and prudent financial management. However, few can demonstrate unequivocal success in learning outcomes. We have observed some specialised providers achieving incremental improvements in specific areas but comprehensive educational solutions remain elusive.

Will such cases recur or was it a peculiar set of circumstances during the pandemic that led to the madness we saw in the K12 sector?

Future recurrences are highly probable, though ideally with less frequency. The case of SmartClass companies exemplifies this pattern. They promoted the installation of large display screens as a solution for enhanced learning outcomes. A critical question at that juncture should have been the international precedent for such an approach, which was notably absent. Subsequently, numerous companies emerged with similar offerings. This pattern resembles other speculative ventures wherein initial success breeds imitation. Recurrence prevention requires heightened vigilance and robust safeguards. The education sector demands particularly stringent validation protocols, exceeding those of other industries.

What about higher education? Are there better ways of assessing what one learns in college?

Interestingly, while the past 15 years have seen the emergence of various assessment tools like PISA, TIMMS, and our ASSET test for primary and secondary education, higher education continues to rely primarily on institutional reputation, networking opportunities, recruitment patterns, and alumni success metrics. The fundamental question of measuring the value added between matriculation and graduation remains unaddressed. Given that this period coincides with natural maturation and development, attributing specific outcomes to institutional influence becomes particularly challenging. In terms of measuring outcomes and learning effectiveness, the challenges in higher education may be even more pronounced than those in primary and secondary education.