Grand Strategy | India’s Afghan policy must avoid extremes

India’s growing engagement with the Taliban is an idea whose time has come. What is interesting to note is that New Delhi’s post-2021 Afghan policy has adeptly avoided two competing demands. Some urge India to adopt a moralistic stance and condemn the Taliban's treatment of its citizens, advocating for non-engagement. On the other extreme of the spectrum, some argue that India should fan the fire in the ongoing Pakistan-Afghanistan standoff. While both arguments are tempting, they may do little to advance India’s interests.

The moral temptation

There is a strong objection from Indian rights activists, Afghans who fled the country in 2021 and some members of the international community to India engaging the Taliban who came to power in the country after overthrowing the Ashraf Ghani government in 2021. The argument suggests that engagement of the Taliban not only legitimises their reprehensible policies but may also embolden them. India must therefore, the argument goes, condemn the Taliban and refuse to engage them.

The moral objections to India’s engagement with the Taliban indeed arise out of genuine concern for the people of Afghanistan but are way off the mark. Let me explain why. For one, war-ravaged and impoverished Afghans need material assistance. It is unfair to deprive them of aid and assistance just because Afghanistan doesn’t have a liberal democratic government. Indeed, doing so is further worsening the already dire situation of hapless Afghans.

Second, while Delhi can convey its deep disapproval to the Taliban regarding their treatment of women and minorities during bilateral discussions, it is not New Delhi’s business to guide the Taliban toward a “righteous path.” Countries must shun the insistence that they will only talk to another country after fitting them into their desired shape and form, ideologically or otherwise.

Moreover, engagement does not equate to recognition; by engaging the Taliban, New Delhi is not condoning the Taliban’s behaviour nor legitimising it. If democracy is a valued moral principle domestically, respecting another country’s sovereignty is equally important in the conduct of foreign policy.

The other temptation

On the opposite end of the moral debate is the argument among sections of the Indian strategic community that India should proactively engage with the Taliban to create difficulties for Pakistan on its north-western border, thereby giving Pakistan a taste of its own medicine. This argument suggests that the more New Delhi can keep Pakistan busy with its north-western border, the better it is for India’s north-western border. There are at least three problems with this argument.

For one, the Pakistan army is capable of creating low-intensity trouble for India while still dealing with the Taliban. Two, if indeed there is a reconciliation between the Taliban and Pakistan, our strategy would be a lost cause. Thirdly, by proactively creating trouble for Pakistan using the Taliban, we may be giving an open invitation to Pakistan to follow the same strategy in future against India. Our objective should be to rise above these petty conflicts and formulate policies that align with our broader geopolitical goals in the region and beyond. Ultimately, our goal is not to incite the Taliban against Pakistan—something that could happen on its own—but rather to prevent Pakistan from using the Taliban as a tool against India. If being a mere spectator while Pakistan and Afghanistan fight it out serves that objective, then that is the approach we should adopt.

It is important to recognise that India’s interests in Afghanistan are secondary: our primary objective is reducing pressure on our north-western frontier, not engaging in nation-building in Afghanistan. If the ongoing Pakistan-Afghanistan standoff alleviates that pressure, so be it; however, actively engaging in that conflict is neither wise nor sustainable for us in the long run. Another key objective is to maintain India’s goodwill and standing among the Afghan people. Finally, in the context of India’s broader Central Asia policy, a stable and friendly government in Afghanistan is beneficial.

To meet these objectives, we should adopt a clinical, interests-driven, and outcome-oriented policy towards the Taliban. Moreover, our engagement with Afghanistan should extend beyond the Taliban; India must increase the issuance of humanitarian and education visas to Afghans. In meeting these objectives, there is a lot India can do in Afghanistan without moralising or getting entangled in the Pakistan-Afghanistan quarrels. This is the space India should make use of.

There is no shame in engaging the Taliban, however reprehensible the Taliban may be and however immoral that might look to some people. States have a hierarchy of values, and in that hierarchy, protecting the country’s interests takes precedence over moral considerations.

Happymon Jacob teaches India’s foreign policy at JNU and is the Editor of INDIA'S WORLD magazine. The views expressed are personal